Department Colloquium - Marcel Nutz

Marcel Nutz, Department of Statistics, Columbia University

Convergence to the Mean Field Game Limit: A Case Study
Mean field games are used as approximations to n-player games with large n. Indeed, n-player Nash equilibria are known to converge to their mean field counterpart when the latter is unique. In this talk we study a specific stochastic game where both the finite and infinite player versions naturally admit multiple equilibria. It turns out that mean field equilibria satisfying a transversality condition are indeed limits of n-player equilibria, but we also find a complementary class of equilibria that are not limits, thus questioning their interpretation as large n equilibria. (Joint work with Jaime San Martin and Xiaowei Tan)

Friday, April 26 at 3:00pm to 4:00pm

Engineering Center, ECCR 265
1111 Engineering Drive, Boulder, CO 80309

Event Type



Science & Technology, Research & Innovation


General Public

College, School & Unit

Engineering & Applied Science

Applied Mathematics
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