Carl F. Mela is the T. Austin Finch Foundation Professor of Business Administration at Duke University. He holds an engineering degree from Brown University and a Ph.D. in Marketing from Columbia University. Prof. Mela applies economic and statistical models to measure the long-term effects of marketing activity on brand equity as well as the role of the Internet and new media on consumer and firm behavior.

Title: Targeting Information in Ad Auction Mechanisms

Abstract: Digital advertising platforms and publishers sell ad inventory that conveys targeting information, such as demographic, contextual, or behavioral audience segments, to advertisers. While revealing this information improves ad relevance, it can reduce competition and lower auction revenues. To resolve this trade-off, this paper develops a general auction mechanism -- the Information-Bundling Position Auction (IBPA) mechanism -- that leverages the targeting information to maximize publisher revenue across both search and display advertising environments. The proposed mechanism treats the ad inventory type as the publisher's private information and allocates impressions by comparing advertisers' marginal revenues.

Link to paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.09541

Zoom link: https://cuboulder.zoom.us/j/95699195297?from=addon